PORTUGUESE-AMERICANS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS POWER STRUCTURE:

A POSITIONAL ANALYSIS

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CENTER FOR PORTUGUESE STUDIES & CULTURE

Prepared by

CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

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DARTMOUTH

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1.00 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

There are significant concentrations of Portuguese-Americans in Massachusetts, but despite their presence in the state for more than eight decades there is not a single study that analyzes their political and cultural power in the state. The one previous effort to develop an empirical profile of the political culture of Portuguese-Americans in Massachusetts found that Portuguese-Americans have low levels of civic and political participation, although their level of participation was not generally lower than that of other groups in the state (Barrow et al. 2002). Moreover, their political attention was generally focused more on state and local politics than on national political issues and thus it was more likely that their potential influence as an ethnically-based interest group would first manifest itself at those levels of government and society. On the other hand, the same study found that the Portuguese-American community is “deeply fractured” between a significant minority who feel that Portuguese ethnicity should be constituted as a political identity versus a substantial majority who view Portuguese ethnicity as primarily a social and cultural identity. Consequently, it was concluded that any potential impact on regional or statewide politics would depend “on the ability of Portuguese-Americans to enter the political system in greater numbers and to do so as a coherent political force with a unified voice” (Ibid., 25-31).

While there are major bodies of scholarly work in political science, sociology, and ethnic studies that analyze the historical and contemporary political role of African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and many other racial and ethnic groups,¹ the potentially significant political and civic role of Portuguese-Americans in selected areas of the country continues to receive very little attention from scholars in these fields.² Even within the confines of Massachusetts politics, there are notable works on the political and cultural influence of the Irish (Handlin 1977; O’Connor 1995), Germans (Goethe Society 1981), African-Americans (Jennings and King 1986), and Latinos (Hardy-Fanta 1993), but Portuguese-Americans still command little interest outside the field of immigration studies (Williams 1992), labor studies (Bedford 1966, 1995; Silvia 1973; Borges 1990), and comparative literature. This study is a preliminary effort to fill that lacuna that draws on the theory of ethnic succession (Dahl 1961) and the methodology of power structure analysis (Domhoff 1978, Chap. 4).


1.10 Portuguese of the United States

Portugal and its former colonies historically have one of the highest emigration rates in Europe. Portuguese immigrants from the Azores, the Madeiras, the Cape Verde islands, and continental Portugal have arrived in the United States since the early 1800’s. U.S. immigration figures do not distinguish among the various origins of Portuguese immigrants, but it is estimated that a majority of Portuguese immigrants in the Massachusetts are Azoreans. Portuguese immigration to the United States occurred mainly in two waves related to economic (1890-1910) and political (1950-1970) factors in Portugal (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

The first recorded group of Portuguese immigrants arrived in the United States in 1820. The majority of these immigrants were Azorean men who worked on American whaling vessels. An expanding whaling industry and poor living conditions in the Azores increased the level of Portuguese immigration during the 1860’s and 1870’s, which was the heyday of U.S. whaling trade. Azorean migration to the United States accelerated in the early 1900’s as social networks developed between native Azoreans and friends and family members who resided in America. These social networks played a major role in determining where Portuguese immigrants settled in the United States. Much of the first wave of Portuguese immigration was concentrated in a number of Southeastern Massachusetts communities, where immigrants soon found employment in the region’s booming textile, apparel, and

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3 Jose Luis Ribeiro, Portuguese Immigrants and Education (Bristol, RI: Portuguese-American Federation, 1982); Jerry R. Williams. 2005. In Pursuit of Their Dreams: A History of Azorean Immigration to the United States. North Dartmouth, MA: Center for Portuguese Study and Culture, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. ; John Silva, Jr., Azoreans in America and Americans in the Azores (Bristol, R.I.: Portuguese-American Federation, 1969). U.S. immigration data only identifies individuals as “Portuguese” if they emigrated from Portugal or its islands. It is known that many Lusophones emigrate from countries other than Portugal (e.g. Brazil, Canada, France, Angola, Mozambique) and, consequently, the number of Lusophone immigrants is likely higher than the official numbers.


5 Jerry R. Williams, And Yet They Come: Portuguese Immigration from the Azores to the United States (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1992).
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fishing industries. By 1900, Massachusetts temporarily surpassed California in having the largest Portuguese population in the country.

Portuguese immigration began to slow in the 1920’s due to new U.S. immigration policies, which purposely restricted immigration from southern Europe by establishing literacy requirements and a quota system. Substantial Portuguese immigration would not occur again until the 1960’s when the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 eliminated the quota system and replaced it with a system of preferential categories. The Act gave immigration preference to the spouses, siblings, sibling’s spouses, and sibling’s children of U.S. residents who applied to enter the United States. These preferences were used heavily by Portuguese immigrants. Following this change in U.S. immigration policy, at least 177,775 Portuguese immigrants arrived in the United States and, by 1975, the number of immigrants arriving from Portugal exceeded that of every other country in Europe. Portuguese immigration to the United States has slowed considerably since the home country’s political revolution, although the United States is still the world’s largest host to Portuguese immigrants.

The U.S. Census estimates that there were 916,581 persons of Portuguese ancestry in the United States in 2000, which is an increase from 900,060 in 1990 (U.S. Census SF3 2000). The Portuguese are primarily concentrated in eight states, with the highest numbers of Portuguese in California and Massachusetts, although Rhode Island and Hawaii have the highest proportion of Portuguese as a percentage of the state population (see Table 1).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1990 Number</th>
<th>1990 % State</th>
<th>2000 Number</th>
<th>2000 % State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>275,492</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>254,541</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>241,173</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>232,472</td>
<td>4.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>76,773</td>
<td>8.20%</td>
<td>74,323</td>
<td>8.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>56,928</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>63,568</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>23,975</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>37,113</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>35,523</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>36,255</td>
<td>1.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>34,455</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>34,282</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>39,748</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>32,156</td>
<td>2.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other States</td>
<td>115,993</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>151,871</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>900,060</td>
<td></td>
<td>916,581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, STF3 File

7 see, Ribeiro, Portuguese Immigrants and Education.
8 Curriculum Research and Development Center, The Need to Develop a System for the Assessment/Testing of Portuguese Speaking Students (Kingston, RI: University of Rhode Island, 1997).
1.20 Portuguese of Massachusetts

There are 232,472 residents in Massachusetts who claim Portuguese as their primary ancestry, which is 4.3% of the state’s total reported ancestries (U.S. Census SF3 2000). Persons of Portuguese heritage reside in all but 33 of Massachusetts’ 351 towns and cities (see Figure 2). Fall River (49.6%), Dartmouth (43.0%), New Bedford (41.2%), Somerset (39.4%), and Acushnet (36.9%) have the highest percentage of residents who are primarily of Portuguese ancestry, although there are 24 towns and cities statewide that have a Portuguese population of 10 percent or greater (see Table 2).

![Figure 2: The Portuguese of Massachusetts](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Portuguese Communities in Massachusetts, 2000</th>
<th>Primary Ancestry Portuguese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Town/City</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall River</td>
<td>39,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dartmouth</td>
<td>11,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Bedford</td>
<td>33,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>6,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acushnet</td>
<td>3,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea</td>
<td>4,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westport</td>
<td>4,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dighton</td>
<td>1,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairhaven</td>
<td>4,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>2,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taunton</td>
<td>13,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludlow</td>
<td>4,322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, STF3 File
1.30 Portuguese of Southeastern Massachusetts

The state’s densest geographical concentration of Portuguese-Americans is in the towns and cities of Southeastern Massachusetts. Southeastern Massachusetts consists of 48 cities and towns in Bristol, Plymouth, and Norfolk Counties. The region is 1,224 square miles in area and has a population of 1,024,179 (U.S. Census 2000). The major cities in the region, which account for 36.9 percent of the region’s population, are Attleboro, Brockton, Fall River, New Bedford, and Taunton. A “Portuguese Archipelago” cuts a swath across the eastern and southern sections of the Southeast region and consists of 21 cities and towns in Bristol and Plymouth Counties (see Figure 3).9 The Portuguese Archipelago has a total population of 516,612 (U.S. Census 2000). The major cities in the region, which account for about 55 percent of the region’s population, are Attleboro, Fall River, New Bedford, and Taunton. More than thirty percent (30.5%) of the residents in this ethnic archipelago (N=132,376) are primarily of Portuguese heritage.10 This percentage is nearly three times that of any other ancestry group in this area (see Table 3). Eleven of the twenty-one cities and towns in the archipelago have at least twenty percent of residents who claim Portuguese as their primary ancestry.

Figure 3

Portuguese Archipelago

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9 There is no standard definition of Southeastern Massachusetts. The region is often defined to include the four cities of Bristol County (Attleboro, Fall River, New Bedford, and Taunton) and their surrounding towns, while another definition includes all of Bristol County and parts of Plymouth County. The definition for this report is based on the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) definition from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2000.

10 Persons of Portuguese heritage in this report do not include Brazilians or Cape Verdeans. In 2000, there were 11,057 Cape Verdeans and 1,233 Brazilians in Southeastern Massachusetts.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Ancestry</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Canadian</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verdean</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, SF3 File; Puerto Rican data from Census SF4 File

More than two-thirds of the Portuguese living in Southeastern Massachusetts arrived between 1960 and 1980 (see Table 4) with nearly all arriving from mainland Portugal/Madeira (74.5%) or the Azores (22.2%).
Table 5). Though it has been thirty years since the last major wave of Portuguese immigration ended, the Portuguese are still a newer immigrant group in the region compared to other European ancestries, with the majority of the Portuguese in the region being first or second generation.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1960</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1970</td>
<td>11,375</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1980</td>
<td>14,069</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 - 1990</td>
<td>6,390</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 2000</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data represents Portuguese who were living in the year 2000.
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 5% File
Table 5

From Where Did the Portuguese Arrive?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Ancestry</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (Includes Madeira)</td>
<td>28,339</td>
<td>74.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores Islands</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>22.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data represents those who indicate that they are primarily Portuguese and who were living in the year 2000.

Source: U.S. Census PUMS 5% File
2.00 METHOD OF POWER STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

Power structure analysis is a methodological approach which views the organized control, possession, and ownership of “key resources” as the basis for exercising power in any society. Key resources typically consist of wealth, status, political office, and knowledge (Domhoff 1967). In every society, control over these key resources is institutionalized through specific (and often competing) organizations of the economy, society, government, and culture.

Importantly, institutions organize these types of power in a society by vesting certain “positions,” and the individuals occupying those positions, with the authority to make decisions about how to deploy the key resources mobilized and controlled by that institution. For instance, as an economic institution, the modern corporation vests its board of directors and executive officers with the authority to allocate any economic resources owned or controlled by the corporation, including the deployment of personnel within the organization. Likewise, government vests specific public offices—both elected and appointed--with the authority to employ administrative coercion or police force against anyone who fails to comply with the law or to deploy budgeted financial resources to implement specific policies that benefit targeted recipients. Similarly, educational institutions certify specific individuals as possessing expertise in particular fields of knowledge. Cultural institutions certify what counts as “art” and “culture” by serving as a repository of its symbols and artifacts and by financially supporting its creation and reproduction. In this sense, the individuals who occupy positions of institutional authority in a society control different types of power: economic power, political power, intellectual power, or cultural power.

On this basis, power can be imputed to particular groups of individuals to the degree that they control resources such as wealth, force, status, or knowledge. A “power structure” consists of a patterned distribution of resources that is regularized by the institutions within a particular society and by the structured interrelations between those institutions. Steven Lukes (1974, 41) suggests that “an attribution of the exercise of power involves, among other things, the double claim that A acts (or fails to act) in a certain way and that B does what he would not otherwise do” as a consequence of A’s act (or failure to act). It is the ability to deploy key resources that makes the exercise of power possible and to deploy these resources it is necessary to occupy the institutional positions and roles vested with that authority.

The “positional method” of analyzing a power structure can be traced to the 1950’s with the publication of Floyd Hunter’s Community Power Structure (1953) and C. Wright Mills’, The Power Elite (1956). These were the first modern empirical studies to utilize positional analysis as a method for understanding local and national power structures, respectively. Mills in particular sought to explain the interlocking hierarchy of the United States military, government, and business elite by mapping an interlocking network of power based on institutional rank and affiliation in multiple institutions. Mills (1956, 366) argues that this method of defining an elite has both practical and theoretical advantages: “The practical advantage is that it seems the easiest and the most concrete ‘way into’ the whole problem,” since “a good deal of information is more or less readily available” to researcher. The theoretical advantage to the positional method (which had yet to be termed) was that it did not force the investigator(s) to prejudge what it was they were investigating, such as social or economic connections. According to Mills (1956, 355-67): “We should leave open the type of characters which the members of the elite in fact turn out to have, rather than by definition select them in terms of one type or another.”

Since C. Wright Mills, the positional method has been utilized to map power structures by many other social scientists. G. William Domhoff is perhaps the most notable contemporary power structure analyst, who has employed the positional method for many of his studies on national power networks, including his well-known study Who Rules America? (1967), a study that has generated a number of follow-up studies by the same author. Richard Zweigenhaft’s “Who Represents America?” in The
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*Insurgent Sociologist* (Spring 1975) and Ralph Miliband’s *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969) are also examples of the positional method in power structure research (Domhoff 1978).

A key methodological assumption of power structure analysis is that patterned distributions of key resources institutionalize the levels of power that specific groups or individuals can potentially deploy against other individuals or that they can deploy in realizing their objectives at any given time and place. The research agenda generated by this theoretical framework is driven by the further assumption that one can develop empirical maps of a power structure by measuring the relative degrees of power controlled by different groups of individuals. Relative amounts of power are indicated by the degree to which those who control a particular resource (e.g., political power) are able: 1. to monopolize the control of a key resource, and 2. to monopolize the control of other key resources that potentially supply other groups with competing sources of power. Power structures can be conceptualized along the spectrum of two theoretical axioms that capture whether the distribution of key resources provides the basis for cumulative inequalities or dispersed inequalities (Dahl 1961, 7-8; Truman 1971).

Axiom 1: The more widely dispersed the institutional control of key resources, the more reasonable it becomes to describe a power structure as egalitarian.

Axiom 2: The more concentrated the institutional control of key resources, the more reasonable it becomes to describe a power structure as one dominated by an oligarchy (wealth), theocracy (religion), patriarchy (gender), or a form of apartheid (ethnic/racial).

Thus, for example, a simple indicator of economic power would be to measure the distribution of wealth and income among different groups or classes in society. One indicator of social status would be to measure the social reputation accorded certain occupational groups such as corporate executives, lawyers, or professors. The most effective way to chart linkages between sources of power is to measure the degree to which specific groups of individuals hold overlapping positions of authority. For example, do those groups who control knowledge and information, such as professors, also command greater social prestige or do they simultaneously control positions of state power? If so, a power structure analysis would infer that such groups control “more power” than if they did not hold overlapping positions of authority in society.

From this perspective, one way to measure the degree of potential political or cultural power is to quantify the extent to which members of a particular class, ethnic or racial group, gender, or religious denomination have hold decision-making positions in the institutions that wield political and cultural power. One measures this “colonization” process simply by counting heads; namely, by quantifying how far the means of political decision-making is controlled by members of a particular group. Thus, an analysis of the colonization process seeks to find out whether or not members of a particular group also hold most of the decision-making positions in these institutions and therefore potentially have the ability to act in concert in the pursuit of their group interests. According to Ralph Miliband (1969, 54), positional control of the governmental apparatus is considered particularly important in power structure analysis, because: “It is these institutions in which ‘state power’ lies, and it is through them that this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who occupy the leading positions in each of these institutions.” For this reason, power structure researchers attach considerable importance to the social composition of the governmental elite, since its group composition creates “a strong presumption...as to its general outlook, ideological dispositions and political bias” in the way it will wield political power” (Ibid., 68).

Similarly, G. William Domhoff (1978, 130-31) suggests that one of the most basic questions in any power structure analysis is to determine what social class, economic group, ethnic group, or religious group is the dominant force within a given community or nation. Depending on the focus of the research,
the indicators of group membership may vary. Nevertheless, membership indicators become a vital element in the process of quantifying what particular groups control decision-making positions. The purpose of this study is to assess the comparative status of Portuguese-Americans in the state and local power structure of Massachusetts. The process began by identifying major state level institutions (i.e., positions of authority) and local institutions in towns and cities identified as having a significant (8% or more) proportion of Portuguese-American residents. The state level institutions identified for purposes of the study consist of executive, legislative, judicial, and educational decision-making organizations:

1. Constitutional Officers of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
2. Governor’s Senior Staff and Cabinet Officials,
3. Governor’s Council,
4. Board of the Massachusetts Port Authority,
5. Board of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,
6. Massachusetts State Legislature (House of Representatives and Senate),
7. Massachusetts Board of Education,
8. Massachusetts Board of Higher Education,
9. University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees,
10. Trustees of the State and Community Colleges,
11. Chancellors or Presidents of the University of Massachusetts, State and Community Colleges,
12. State District Court judges,

The local level institutions identified for purposes of the study consist of governmental, educational, health and charitable decision-making organizations primarily in the state’s Portuguese Archipelago on the presumption that Portuguese-Americans would be most likely to penetrate the local power structure in those communities where they have a significant presence in the population. These towns and cities are most likely to provide opportunities for ethnic succession, because there are second and third generation Portuguese concentrated in neighborhood enclaves. These enclaves provide the numerical electoral base for ethnic candidacies and often have electoral districts that are heavily, or even predominantly, Portuguese by ethnicity. The local level institutions identified for purposes of this study consist of governmental, educational, and health and charitable organizations:

1. School Committees of towns and cities in the “Portuguese Archipelago” and selected towns on Cape Cod,
2. Mayors and City Councils of the four cities in the Portuguese Archipelago,
3. Boards of Selectmen in the Massachusetts SouthCoast,
4. Town Administrators in the Massachusetts SouthCoast,
5. Administration and Trustees of SouthCoast Health Systems,
6. University of Massachusetts Dartmouth Foundation Board of Trustees,
7. United Way of Fall River Board of Directors,
8. United Way of New Bedford Board of Directors and Executive Committee,
9. YMCA Greater Fall River,
10. YMCA SouthCoast,
11. Boys and Girls Club of Fall River Board of Directors,
12. Boys and Girls Club of New Bedford Board of Directors,
13. Community Foundation of Southeastern Massachusetts.
These state and local institutions generated a list of 1,329 positions collectively vested with significant decision-making authority.\textsuperscript{11} For purposes of this study, which focuses on the position of Portuguese-Americans in the state and local power structure, ethnicity was determined by surname, and to a lesser extent, by the personal familiarity of the researchers with the person in question. Six people who are familiar with state and local politics in Massachusetts and/or the Portuguese-American community in Massachusetts were asked to identify the ethnicity of these 1,200 persons.\textsuperscript{12} Each of the key informants was provided with a list of the positions and a key code and asked to identify the ethnicity of each individual on the list. If the surname or personal familiarity was insufficient to make a determination, the individual’s ethnicity was listed as unknown. The results were then assembled and compared to each other with the principle investigator making a final determination. Where the key informants were split, or where less than half of the key informants were able to make a determination, the individual position was also listed as unknown unless one of the key informants had personal familiarity with the individual.

It is well recognized that such a technique has many limitations, which include the uncertainty of identifying the ethnicity of women who take the surname of their husbands (i.e., ethnic inter-marriage) and the tendency of some immigrants to “Anglicize” their surnames. Despite the limitations of using surnames as an identification technique, it has often been used previously by social scientists to measure the comparative position of various groups in American society. In one of the most widely praised examples of positional analysis, Robert Dahl (1961) used surnames to identify ethnicity in his book \textit{Who Governs?}, which categorized political office holders’ ethnicity as primarily Anglo-Saxon, Irish, Italian, and Russian. More recent studies have used forenames and surnames to analyze the position of Hispanics (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998), Jews (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1982), and women (Borelli 1997; Davis 1997; Diamond 1977) in the power structure, since these groups tend to have fairly identifiable names. This technique was also used in a study done by the Cambridge Planning and Development Department in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which identified people of Portuguese ancestry based on surnames in order to administer a questionnaire targeted at the Portuguese-American population (Adler 1972). The results of such studies have often been used to influence the selection of executive and judicial appointments and other appointments to major public sector and non-profit. boards by generating increased awareness among target populations of their position in politics, education, and society.

\textsuperscript{11} There were 644 positions at the state level and 685 at the local level. The individuals occupying these positions held office in 2003.

\textsuperscript{12} These six individuals who coded the results are (1) Clyde W. Barrow, Director, Center for Policy Analysis, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, (2) David R. Borges, Senior Research Associate, Center for Policy Analysis, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, (3) Frank Sousa, Director, Center for Portuguese Studies & Culture, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, (4) Gina Reis, Assistant Director, Center for Portuguese Studies & Culture, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, (5) Paul Vigeant, Executive Director, SouthCoast Development Partnership, (6) Robert Correia, State Representative, Massachusetts House of Representatives, Fall River, Massachusetts.
3.00 THE THEORY OF ETHNIC SUCCESSION

Massachusetts is an ethnically and racially diverse state that has witnessed continuous waves of immigration since the first English settlers arrived at Plymouth in 1620. During the last 350 years, the state has become a home to Irish, French, French-Canadian, Italian, Polish, Syrian, Lebanese, Jewish, and African-American populations. In the last decade, the state has seen an influx of Latino, Asian, and Russian immigrants. To one degree or another, this is a pattern that has long characterized the social development of the United States, although the specific immigrant groups involved may vary from one region of the country to another. The theory of ethnic succession was developed by pluralist theorists following World War II to account for the changing patterns of politics and power that were often observed in the country’s cities, where immigrants tended to congregate in search of low-skilled jobs, inexpensive housing, and ethnic support networks that would assist their transition to a new country (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1980; Truman 1971).

The basic thesis of this theory is that American political development, particularly at the local level, has traversed a path from oligarchy to pluralism over the last 250 years. The theory of ethnic succession was most persuasively advanced by Robert A. Dahl in his book *Who Governs?*, which used a power structure methodology to document the changing pattern of politics and power in New Haven, Connecticut over a 200 year period. Oscar Handlin would later document an almost identical pattern of political development in Boston, Massachusetts (1977), while Robert D. Brown (1978) has described a similar pattern at the state level in Massachusetts. In all of these studies, the main empirical evidence for arguing that political power structures shifted from oligarchy to pluralism is found in the changing social characteristics of elected and appointed government officials (decision-makers). Each of these scholars identifies a pattern of political development, linked to underlying economic changes, that evolves through three types of power structures.

During the first period (1780-1840) a small group of patrician families in New England enjoyed the benefits of cumulative inequalities that concentrated wealth, income, education, social status, and political office into a power structure known as the Standing Order. The Standing Order was a period where public office holding was almost the exclusive prerogative of old patrician families, whose power was based on the hereditary accumulation and transmission of land. In an agricultural society, where land was the fundamental form of wealth and economic power, its ownership became the basis for accumulating other forms of power as well. Higher education and specialized knowledge were also largely monopolized by members of the Standing Order, who sent their sons to Harvard and Yale Universities, where they became attorneys and ministers and thereby maintained their control of the courts and the churches. The members of the Standing Order were generally English by ancestry and Episcopalian or Congregational by religion. With tightly knit families that tended to inter-marry, the elite members of the Standing Order controlled all levers of economic, political, social, cultural, and religious power until at least the 1840s.

For example, during the period of patrician government in New England, mayors typically came from one of the city’s established families, had graduated from Yale or Harvard College, was a bar certified attorney, retained some connection to their alma mater (e.g., Board of Overseers), and spent most of their life in public affairs (e.g., mayor, state legislature, congress). They were also typically Congregationalist or Episcopalian in religion and had Anglo-Saxon surnames like Bishop, Goodrich, Hoadley, Baldwin, Bristol, etc. Even the occasional exception was based on one’s graduation from Yale or Harvard and one’s cultural socialization into the norms and customs of the patrician elite, including marriage into an established family. During this time, the patricians were also sustained in office through a number of political and institutional mechanisms that included freehold or estate qualifications for voting (disenfranchised many voters), a system of ‘stand-up’ voice voting, the power of local clergy who were allied with (and often originated in) the patrician families (ideology), and the dependence of voters.
on wealthy families for their business and employment, established a power structure that integrated politically through the Federalist (and later Whig) party.\textsuperscript{13}

The Standing Order was always a minority of society, but several factors account for its eventual demise. One factor was the emergence of religious dissent, since most of New England’s residents were not enrolled in the Episcopalian or Congregational churches so their close association with political power generated a great deal of resentment about formal religious discrimination against Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, and others who were mostly members of the artisan and farmer classes. A second factor was the adoption of the secret ballot during the 1820s, which made it possible for those opposed to Standing Order to vote against it without the threat of retaliation. A third factor was the emergence of a modern party organization in 1832 – pioneered by Andrew Jackson and the Democrats -- which encouraged mass mobilization for the first time and provided a political outlet for non-patrician classes and ethnic groups. Finally, the abolition of property qualifications in most states by 1828 ushered in the “democratic revolution by extending the right to vote to all adult white males, although such a right did not come to Connecticut until 1848 and it took an armed insurrection to win this right in Rhode Island in 1840.

These political and religious transformations laid the basis for a second period of political development that extends roughly from the early 1840s to 1900. Starting in the 1840s, a new type of individual (group) rose to prominence in New England politics: the entrepreneurs. This “entrepreneurial period” of political development witnessed the splitting of wealth and political influence on one side from social status and education on the other (i.e., a step toward dispersed inequalities). New England entrepreneurs, like the patricians before them, largely came from old Yankee stock., i.e. they were primarily white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, whose ancestors had been among the earliest immigrants from England. However, the entrepreneurs usually originated from lower-middle class or even lower backgrounds, had no college education and sometimes little formal education, and had usually been engaged in hard physical labor in their youth. Often by luck, but sometimes by insight, these individuals got in on the ground floor of some business enterprise, such as a textile or apparel mill, a retail store, a railroad, or a bank) and rose through the ranks of the rapidly expanding company or saw a small investment grow rapidly into enormous wealth.

The wealth and income of the entrepreneurs often grew to surpass that of the old patricians and they came to represent the ‘American dream’, i.e., that anyone could succeed, or go from rags to riches, while at the same time they could appeal to the common citizen because they had performed manual labor, had little formal education, and did not take on ‘the airs’ of the old patricians. By the end of the Civil both the Republican and the Democratic parties were both running candidates that were indistinguishable in social origins, occupations, and personal achievement. Neither party represented (or was lead by the patricians), but neither did either party represent the largely immigrant (Irish/Welsh/Catholic) working class that began entering New England in the 1840s. Most mayoral elections, for example, were usually a contest between two businessmen, rather than a contest between an entrepreneur and a patrician. While the old Standing Order retained its social status and educational/intellectual influence, it was completely replaced as the leading political force from the 1850s onward.

At the same time, the working class was largely disenfranchised by its members’ status as immigrants (i.e., non-voters), by their lack of political know-how, skills, and wealth, and by the failure of either party to mobilize them into state and municipal political life. Thus, despite their popularity, the entrepreneurs also suffered from one acute political vulnerability in the formally democratic structure of American politics. They lacked numbers and as immigrants became citizens a group of “ex-plebeians”

\textsuperscript{13} Brown (1978, 126-27) observes that in Massachusetts also the Federalist party was the “source of integration of public affairs. Plugged sustain the orthodox religious establishment and to defend the interests of commerce and manufacturing tradesmen, it commanded great support in eastern Massachusetts and in the more prosperous, commercially developed towns to the west, particularly in the Connecticut Valley…Minorities, whether religious or political, were much quicker to recognize the necessity of pluralism than were the majorities who still cherished the ideal of uniformity.”
ushered in a third period of political development which extends from about 1900 to the present. This period is characterized by state and municipal governments that are controlled by “ex-plebeians,” who rose out of working class and lower-middle class families with immigrant origins to become political leaders.

Beginning at the turn of the century, a group that Robert Dahl calls the ex-plebes exploited their popularity with growing numbers of working class and immigrant residents to displace the entrepreneurs from political office. The social foundation of this transformation was the long process of immigration, which began to differentiate the ethnic and religious affiliation of the lower-middle class and working class from the old patricians and entrepreneurs. The swelling ranks of the lower-middle class and working class were filled first by the Irish in the 1840s and then by Italians and East Europeans (e.g., Poles, Russians) in the 1880s. These groups came from a different ethnic stock and nationality than earlier immigrants. In Massachusetts, these groups were also joined by the French and French Canadians and later by Syrians and Lebanese. The new immigrants often did not have English as their first language and they were overwhelmingly Catholic in religion. These overlapping group affiliations (i.e., class, ethnicity, national origins, native vs. immigrant, religion) developed into a deep division between these classes and the entrepreneurs. At the same time, a sprinkling of Jews from Eastern Europe and African-Americans from the South came to New England in search of employment and they too shared a sense of exploitation, discrimination, and “difference” from established groups.

Moreover, in contrast to the entrepreneurs, these groups faced a stark contrast between the American promise of equality and equal opportunity and the reality of harsh economic exploitation and various forms of ethnic, racial, and religious discrimination that excluded them from the promise of American life. Consequently, any political leader who could help members of a particular ethnic group overcome the handicaps and humiliations associated with their identity, or who could help increase the power, prestige, and income of these groups, had an effective platform for winning their political support. In addition to the advantages of numbers, the ex-plebes implemented institutional changes to the political structure that facilitated their further rise to power and their maintenance of power, while establishing a system of pluralist bargaining over government services and contracts.

In Massachusetts, as elsewhere in New England, Brown (1978, 194) finds that “the Democratic party was the most prominent agent of inter-group and inter-class coalition in Massachusetts,” but the Democrats remained a minority party in the Bay State until 1920. Between 1860 and 1919, Republicans monopolized both of the state’s U.S. Senate seats and controlled the vast majority of its seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. A comparable pattern of Republican dominance characterized state politics and, as Brown (1978, 196) also notes, the leaders of the Republican party continued to be “old-line Harvard-educated Yankees.” This group was “not so much hostile as they were indifferent to the wishes of immigrant voters” (Brown 1978, 196). At the same time, because of its early industrialization, as well as large-scale non-English immigration, states like Massachusetts and Connecticut were on the leading edge of a new “pragmatic pluralism” based on neighborhood politics and ethnic coalitions.

The most important institutional change to advance this political transformation was the adoption of the ward system beginning in the 1850s. Initially, wards were merely a way to organize elections and ballot counting in an electoral system that was being overburdened by a growing population and rising numbers of voters. In response to these pressures, most municipalities steadily increased the number of wards in their jurisdiction from the late 1850s onward. However, this new system of neighborhood elections also made it easier for ethnic groups, who were generally isolated in their own neighborhood enclaves, and where they constituted a majority, to elect individuals on a platform of ethnic representation. Politics was largely about ethnicity, and since ethnic groups are segregated by neighborhood, wards became known as Irish, Italian, Polish, etc.

However, the ward system also facilitated a change in the occupational and class composition of mayors, boards of aldermen and selectmen, city councils, and state legislatures. During this period, it became increasingly common to not only see the election of persons from various ethnic backgrounds, but also individuals such as plumbers, painters, and other blue-collar workers. By 1900, there had been a noticeable decline in the number of entrepreneurs (businessmen and professionals) in municipal
government, especially, who were being replaced by lower-middle class and working class individuals of non-English ethnic backgrounds. Dahl claims that the ex-plebes thereby finally disassociated political power from wealth and income by drawing on the strength of numbers to win political power. This political power could then be used to redistribute municipal contracts to minority businesses, to give municipal jobs to political supporters (patronage), and to distribute municipal services to supporters (i.e., disperse wealth, income, and public services). These patronage jobs helped immigrants move into the white-collar middle class as school teachers, policemen, firemen, and civil servants so that political power became a mechanism for achieving economic and social gains, while eliminating discriminatory barriers based on race, ethnicity, or religion. By the turn of the last century, it was commonly accepted that government jobs, minor offices, and other appointive positions in government would be distributed to favor persons of ethnic and immigrant backgrounds.

The Irish, who were the first to benefit from the process of ethnic succession, are considered the archetype ethnic group for using politics to advance themselves socially and economically and to rise out of the working class. For example, in New Haven, Dahl found that by 1933, persons of Irish descent held over half of all city jobs in New Haven even though they constituted only 13 percent of the city’s population. These jobs which included positions as school teachers, policemen, city and court clerks, commissioners, and professional politicians allowed many Irish to move into the white-collar middle class through public sector employment. By the 1950s, census records for New Haven indicate that the Irish had used their political leverage over municipal contracts to move into business and the professions. They also used religion (i.e., Catholicism) to forge alliances with other ethnic groups (e.g., Germans, Italians, and Poles) with the result that by 1933 three out of four (75%) of the family heads employed by New Haven were Catholic, even Catholics were only 56% of the city’s population. Handlin’s (1977) study of Boston finds a similar pattern of development in that city.

Nevertheless, Dahl argues that as the Irish evolved into New England’s consummate political class by achieving dominance in government, they (or any similarly positioned ethnic group) were not inclined to open that system voluntarily to newer immigrants. Similarly, in Massachusetts, Brown (1978, 215) observes that well into the twentieth century “memories and traditions, as well as economic and electoral competition, sustained hostilities while they nurtured group consciousness.” The result is that newer immigrant groups were not able to so easily use politics as a means of social mobility and accession to power. Dahl finds that the Irish stranglehold on politics and government led New Haven’s Italian and Russian (Jewish) immigrants to move into small business and the learned professions as the primary avenue of social and economic mobility. For instance, by 1933, Russians and Italians constituted 2/3 of all shopkeepers in New Haven. As Dahl observes, the Italians were partially blocked by the Irish (Democrats), which led them to seek political in New Haven through the Republican party, where by 1940 they were receiving numerous nominations and elected candidates. In 1945, the first Italian Republican was elected mayor of New Haven. In this way, a competitive party system further facilitates and promotes the pluralization of political power among ethnic groups. The Irish Democrats responded to the Italian-Republican challenge by appointing more Italians to important municipal jobs so that by the 1950s Italians, and even Russian Jews, were “overrepresented” in municipal jobs, which they could then use to redirect municipal contracts to allied businesses and professionals.

As a consequence, the ethnic “pluralization” of state and municipal politics also typically sees a rising ethnic group evolve through its own three stages of development. In the first stage, members of an ethnic group are almost entire proletarian or working class and are predominantly employed in unskilled blue-collar (or now service) occupations. In a second stage of development, the ethnic group becomes more socio-economically heterogeneous as more of them obtain white-collar (or now service) occupations. As a result, the group begins to fracture along class, occupational, and educational lines, although it retains its political, religious, and cultural identity.

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14 Similarly, Brown (1978, 196) that by the end of the 19th century, Massachusetts Republicans also capitalized on newer immigrants’ dissatisfaction with the Irish by courting French Catholic and later Italian Catholic voters “with rhetoric and petty patronage” in districts where they held the balance of power.
However, in a third stage of development, ethnic group becomes highly heterogeneous in socio-economic terms as more of its members rise into high status occupations or entrepreneurial positions and this mainstreaming of socio-economic status eventually impacts the group’s culture, ideology, and life-style as they no longer identify with “immigrant” status, start to marry outside the ethnic group (or even religion), move away from their old neighborhood, lose their accent, and possibly change their political affiliation. It is often observed that in stages one and two, most members of an ethnic group are likely to support the Democratic party and a liberal ideology, but by stage three many members of the group start defecting to the Republican party and a more conservative ideology. One result is that political and cultural elites also become more heterogeneous and representative within each of the two parties and within other governmental and cultural institutions.

The periods and stages establish a pattern of “ethnic succession” that one can still observe in the United States and Massachusetts as ever new waves of immigrants come to the state. In the first generation, an immigrant-ethnic group will have low levels of educational attainment, be primarily confined to low-paying unskilled jobs, and have little access to the system of political representation. By the second generation, the ethnic group should break into the system of political representation and begin using those levers to move supporters into public sector jobs and to support ethnically-owned business and professional establishments. By the third generation, the ethnic group is often fracturing along socio-economic, cultural, religious, foreign-born, and language boundaries that allow it to “melt” into the “mainstream” of American society.
4.00 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The empirical findings suggest that Portuguese-Americans are underrepresented by approximately 50% at both the state and local levels of the power structure. While the findings may be qualified by the fact that 20 percent of positions were unidentifiable at the state level and 16 percent were unidentifiable at the local level, the relative certainty of recognizing Portuguese surnames makes it unlikely that a significant number of the “unknowns” are of Portuguese ancestry. The data indicate that Portuguese-Americans occupy 2 percent of state level decision-making positions, while they are 4.3 percent of the state’s population. At the local level, Portuguese-Americans occupy 17 percent of the decision-making positions in the Portuguese Archipelago, and selected towns of Cape Cod, although they constitute 30.5 percent of the area’s population. However, this finding should be qualified with the observation that most Portuguese-Americans in Massachusetts are still first and second generation immigrants. Ethnic succession is a long-term process that should start to manifest itself by the second generation and be more or less complete by the third generation. The Portuguese are still the region’s most recent arrivals excepting Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic and Caribbean immigrants, who have begun arriving in significant numbers.

Thus, it is encouraging to note that Portuguese-Americans are best represented in local government (19%), but they remain less well represented in local education (15%). Similarly, at the state level, Portuguese-Americans have achieved near parity by occupying 3 percent of the state legislative positions, but they occupy only 2 percent of the state’s educational decision-making positions (trustees, boards, presidents, chancellors), and statistically have less than 0.5% of the executive and judicial positions at the state level. This is a typical pattern of political succession where ethnic groups win office at the local level, parlay that experience into state legislative campaigns, and then eventually secure executive and judicial appointments and appointments to independent authorities.

While numbers alone do not necessarily capture the distribution of power among various ethnic groups, the data suggest that state level politics revolves around the conflicts and compromises of English, Irish, and Italian power brokers, with African-Americans also having substantial influence in the state’s power structure (Jennings and King 1986), particularly through appointments to judicial and educational positions. This is not an unexpected finding, since it more or less represents the state’s general population. Local politics in the Portuguese Archipelago has a somewhat different complexion, since it tends to revolve around the compromises and conflicts among English, Portuguese, French/French-Canadian, and Irish power brokers, although the Irish are clearly a declining influence as they are gradually displaced by Portuguese-Americans. While Portuguese-Americans are not strictly represented in proportion to their numbers in the population, they are nevertheless far from a disenfranchised or disprivileged group in the political arena.

15 An executive position is typically more powerful than a single legislative position, while members of the legislative leadership, or committee chairs, will command more authority than a junior legislator. Similarly, a mayor will normally wield more power than a single city councilor or even the entire council. Thus, numbers alone do not provide a complete map of any power structure, but a first approximation to the distribution of power.
# Table 6

## Ethnic Distribution of State & Local Decision-Making Positions, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>LOCAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Governmental</th>
<th>Educational</th>
<th>Health &amp; Charitable</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>Authorities</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>9%</td>
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<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Center for Policy Analysis, 2005.
5.00 CONCLUSION

The Portuguese-Americans in Southeastern Massachusetts appear to be following a standard pattern of ethnic succession, which should in time lead to gains in other areas of the power structure, including business, educational, and cultural institutions. However, a key element in ethnic succession is not just numbers, but the degree to which an ethnic or racial group views its identity in political terms. This political identity must be fused with the organizational ability to mobilize voters on an ethnic basis and to identify specific tangible gains in the form of public sector employment, government contracts, the delivery of government services, and the removal of discriminatory barriers through government action. For example, Handlin (1959, 191) observes that the rise of Boston’s Irish to positions of political power was built around Irish political leaders who “consciously or unconsciously, encouraged group solidarity and the maintenance of a virtual Irish party.”

On the other hand, as noted earlier, previous survey research on Portuguese-Americans in Southeastern Massachusetts indicates that the Portuguese-American community is “deeply fractured” between a significant minority who feel that Portuguese ethnicity should be constituted as a political identity versus a substantial majority who now view Portuguese ethnicity as primarily a social and cultural identity (Barrow et al. 2002, , 25-31). Moreover, this same research has documented that most (65.7%) Portuguese-Americans in the area consider themselves “well-represented” politically, while a large majority (78.9%) do not agree that “people are best represented by leaders from their own racial/ethnic background” (Ibid., pp. 90-91). Moreover, the voting behavior in predominantly Portuguese-American electoral wards and districts is consistent with these attitudes.

However, there is also another major structural impediment to the advance of Portuguese-American interests that looms large on the horizon. The Portuguese arrived in Southeastern Massachusetts late in the industrialization process and, in fact, they arrived just as the region’s economic base was beginning to de-industrialize. The basic industries that sustained the economic, political, and cultural rise of previous immigrant groups – fishing, textiles, apparel, and automotive components -- was relocating to foreign locations, while later being replaced by firms in the new post-industrial economy (i.e., marine technology, medical devices, business and professional services, health care). It is likely that these economic disruptions have also destabilized the “normal” dynamic of succession politics and social mobility. The Portuguese arrived late in a region that almost immediately began sinking into a profound economic malaise soon after their arrival.

On the other hand, the system of ethnic succession and assimilation described by Dahl and other pluralist theorists explicitly depends on sustained economic growth, because it creates new economic opportunities for individual and group advancement, while generating the state and local tax revenues that make it possible for government officials to distribute new patronage and services in win-win coalitions with other, more established, ethnic groups. This means that Portuguese-Americans have begun penetrating the political system at a time when state and municipal government is not distributing growth and expansion, but cutting budgets and public sector jobs. Therefore, the only thing to distribute among constituents is retrenchment and decline.

This zero sum scenario means that one group – a new group – can only gain at the expense of older and more established groups, who are not likely to step aside quietly. A politics of economic decline, or economic stagnation, is one that inevitably breeds racial, ethnic, and class conflict as new groups demand equal access to the economic and political system, because it is then no longer possible to distribute a share of new growth to new groups and incorporate them into the power structure without distributing resources from established groups. Indeed, because the established groups control the major levers of power they are in a position to protect their earlier gains even if it requires the exclusion of
newer immigrant groups. Therefore, economic decline effectively locks in the established power structure and locks new immigrant groups into their disadvantaged position in the economy and society even where they make political gains. Thus, the prospects for further advancement may not be promising without improvements to the region’s economic outlook.
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